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• Title:The law and economics of buyer power in EU competition policy / Frederik van Doorn.
  
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• Author/Creator:Doorn, Frederik van.
  
• Published/Created:The Hague, The Netherlands : Eleven International Publishing, [2015]
  

• Holdings

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  • Location:LAW LIBRARY (level 3)Where is this?
    
  • Call Number: KJE6456 .D66 2015
    
  • Number of Items:1
    
  • Status:Available
    

   
• Library of Congress Subjects:Competition, Unfair--European Union countries.
  Antitrust law--European Union countries.
  Sales--European Union countries.
  
• Description:229 pages : illustrations (some color) ; 25 cm
  
• Summary:The trend of retail concentration across the European Union has raised concerns on the buyer power that retailers may have in the relation with their suppliers. Following calls that the changing nature of competition demands a change in EU competition policy, this book investigates whether there is a 'gap' in current EU competition law concerning the potential harmful effects of buyer power from an economic efficiency perspective. Using a Law and Economics approach, the author identifies the potential concerns and assesses whether they can be addressed under the existing rules. While some critical comments are in place with regard to the consumer welfare standard that is applied, the author's analysis does not indicate that the current substantive legal framework of EU competition law is unfit to address the (potential) harmful effects of buyer power.
  
• Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
  In English, with summary in Dutch.
  
• ISBN:9789462365643 hardcover
  9462365644 hardcover
  
• Contents:Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction
  1.1. Introduction
  1.2. Changing Retail Landscape
  1.3. Modernisation of Eu Competition Law
  1.4. Buyer Power Concerns
  1.5. Methodology
  1.6. Outline
  2. Objectives Of Competition Policy
  2.1. Introduction
  2.2. Traditional Rationale For Competition Policy
  2.2.1. Competition and Economic Efficiency
  2.2.2. Monopoly Power
  2.2.3. Conclusion
  2.3. Competition Policy in a Dynamic Context
  2.3.1. Efficiency Trade-Offs
  2.3.2. Anti-Competitive Behaviour
  2.3.3. Conclusion
  2.4. Competition Policy Design
  2.4.1. Formulating Competition Policy
  2.4.2. Welfare Standards
  2.4.3. Conclusion
  2.5. Conclusion
  3. Buyer Power and Competition Policy
  3.1. Introduction
  3.2. Buyer Power: Definition and Sources
  3.2.1. Definition of Buyer Power
  3.2.2. Sources for Buyer Power
  3.2.3. Conclusion
  3.3. Buyer Power And Economic Efficiency
  3.3.1. Monopsony Power
  3.3.2. Countervailing Buyer Power
  3.3.3. Buyer Power and Dynamic Efficiency
  3.3.4. Conclusion
  3.4. Anti-Competitive Buyer Conduct
  3.4.1. Collusion
  3.4.2. Exclusionary Conduct
  3.4.3. Mergers
  3.4.4. Conclusion
  3.5. Buyer Power and Competition Policy Design
  3.5.1. Countervailing Market Power Considerations
  3.5.2. Buyer Power and the Consumer Welfare Standard
  3.5.3. Conclusion
  3.6. Conclusions
  4. Buyer Power in Eu Competition Law
  4.1. Introduction
  4.2. Buyer Conduct in Eu Competition Law
  4.2.1. Introducing the Substantive Legal Framework
  4.2.2. Application to Buyer Conduct
  4.2.3. Conclusion
  4.3. Buyer Collusion
  4.3.1. Addressing Buyer Collusion
  4.3.2. Article 101 TFEU and the Consumer Welfare Standard
  4.3.3. Conclusion
  4.4. Exclusionary Buyer Conduct
  4.4.1. Addressing Exclusionary Buyer Conduct
  4.4.2. Article 102 TFEU and the Consumer Welfare Standard
  4.4.3. Conclusion
  4.5. Mergers That Involve Buyer Power
  4.5.1. Addressing Mergers That Involve Buyer Power
  4.5.2. EU Merger Regulation and the Consumer Welfare Standard
  4.5.3. Conclusion
  4.6. Buyer Power and `Unfair' Business Practices
  4.6.1. EU Competition Law and `Unfair' Business Practices
  4.6.2. Policy Considerations
  4.6.3. Conclusion
  4.7. Conclusions
  5. Conclusions and Summary
  5.1. Introduction
  5.2. Competition Concerns of Buyer Power
  5.3. Buyer Power in Eu Competition Law
  5.4. Conclusions.