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• Title:Reading law : the interpretation of legal texts / Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner.
  
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• Author/Creator:Scalia, Antonin, 1936-2016.
  
• Other Contributors/Collections:Garner, Bryan A.
  
• Published/Created:St. Paul, MN : Thomson/West, ©2012
  

• Holdings

  Holdings Record Display

  • Location:LAW LIBRARY (level 3)Where is this?
    
  • Call Number: K290 .S33 2012
    
  • Number of Items:1
    
  • Status:Available
    

   
• Library of Congress Subjects:Law--Interpretation and construction.
  Judicial process--United States.
  Law--Philosophy.
  Statutes--United States.
  Jurisprudence.
  Law--Methodology.
  
• Medical Subjects: Jurisprudence
  
• Description:xxx, 567 pages ; 24 cm.
  
• Summary:In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style - with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you "using a gun" in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated. - Publisher.
  
• Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 465-506) and index.
  
• ISBN:031427555X
  9780314275554
  
• Contents:Machine generated contents note: A. Why of This Book
  Flood-Control Case
  Need for a Sound Approach
  Prevailing Confusion
  Textualism and Its Challengers
  B. How of This Book
  Some Fundamental Issues
  Permissible Meanings
  "Fair Reading" Method
  Scope and Organization of What Follows
  Flood-Control Case Resolved
  Sound Principles of Interpretation
  Principles Applicable to All Texts
  Prefatory Remarks
  Fundamental Principles
  1. Interpretation Principle. Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation
  2. Supremacy-of-Text Principle. The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text means
  3. Principle of Interrelating Canons. No canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that point in other directions
  4. Presumption Against Ineffectiveness. A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored
  5. Presumption of Validity. An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalidates (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)
  Semantic Canons
  6. Ordinary-Meaning Canon. Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings
  -unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense
  7. Fixed-Meaning Canon. Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted
  8. Omitted-Case Canon. Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered
  9. General-Terms Canon. General terms are to be given their general meaning (generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda)
  10. Negative-Implication Canon. The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius)
  11. Mandatory/Permissive Canon. Mandatory words impose a duty; permissive words grant discretion
  12. Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon. And joins a conjunctive list, or a disjunctive list
  -but with negatives, plurals, and various specific wordings there are nuances
  13. Subordinating/Superordinating Canon. Subordinating language (signaled by subject to) or superordinating language (signaled by notwithstanding or despite) merely shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash
  -but does not necessarily denote a clash of provisions
  14. Gender/Number Canon. In the absence of a contrary indication, the masculine includes the feminine (and vice versa) and the singular includes the plural (and vice versa)
  15. Presumption of Nonexclusive "Include." The verb to include introduces examples, not an exhaustive list
  16. Unintelligibility Canon. An unintelligible text is inoperative
  Syntactic Canons
  17. Grammar Canon. Words are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them
  18. Last-Antecedent Canon. A pronoun, relative pronoun, or demonstrative adjective generally refers to the nearest reasonable antecedent
  19. Series-Qualifier Canon. When there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series
  20. Nearest-Reasonable-Referent Canon. When the syntax involves something other than a parallel series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent
  21. Proviso Canon. A proviso conditions the principal matter that it qualifies
  -almost always the matter immediately preceding
  22. Scope-of-Subparts Canon. Material within an indented subpart relates only to that subpart; material contained in unindented text relates to all the following or preceding indented subparts
  23. Punctuation Canon. Punctuation is a permissible indicator of meaning
  Contextual Canons
  24. Whole-Text Canon. The text must be construed as a whole
  25. Presumption of Consistent Usage. A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning
  26. Surplusage Canon. If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence
  27. Harmonious-Reading Canon. The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory
  28. General/Specific Canon. If there is a conflict between a general provision and a specific provision, the specific provision prevails (generalia specialibus non derogant)
  29. Irreconcilability Canon. If a text contains truly irreconcilable provisions at the same level of generality, and they have been simultaneously adopted, neither provision should be given effect
  30. Predicate-Act Canon. Authorization of an act also authorizes a necessary predicate act
  31. Associated-Words Canon. Associated words bear on one another's meaning {noscitur a sociis)
  32. Ejusdem Generis Canon. Where general words follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis)
  33. Distributive-Phrasing Canon. Distributive phrasing applies each expression to its appropriate referent {reddendo singula singulis)
  34. Prefatory-Materials Canon. A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a permissible indicator of meaning
  35. Title-and-Headings Canon. The title and headings are permissible indicators of meaning
  36. Interpretive-Direction Canon. Definition sections and interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed
  37. Absurdity Doctrine. A provision may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve
  Principles Applicable Specifically to Governmental Prescriptions
  Prefatory Remarks
  Expected-Meaning Canons
  38. Constitutional-Doubt Canon. A statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt
  39. Related-Statutes Canon. Statutes in pari materia are to be interpreted together, as though they were one law
  40. Reenactment Canon. If the legislature amends or reenacts a provision other than by way of a consolidating statute or restyling project, a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning
  41. Presumption Against Retroactivity. A statute presumptively has no retroactive application
  42. Pending-Action Canon. When statutory law is altered during the pendency of a lawsuit, the courts at every level must apply the new law unless doing so would violate the presumption against retroactivity
  43. Extraterritoriality Canon. A statute presumptively has no extraterritorial application (statute suo clauduntur territorio, nee ultra territorium disponunt)
  44. Artificial-Person Canon. The word person includes corporations and other entities, but not the sovereign
  Government-Structuring Canons
  45. Repeatability Canon. The legislature cannot derogate from its own authority or the authority of its successors
  46. Presumption Against Waiver of Sovereign Immunity. A statute does not waive sovereign immunity
  -and a federal statute does not eliminate state sovereign immunity
  -unless that disposition is unequivocally clear
  47. Presumption Against Federal Preemption. A federal statute is presumed to supplement rather than displace state law
  Private-Right Canons
  48. Penalty/Illegality Canon. A statute that penalizes an act makes it unlawful
  49. Rule of Lenity. Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant's favor
  50. Mens Rea Canon. A statute creating a criminal offense whose elements are similar to those of a common-law crime will be presumed to require a culpable state of mind (mens rea) in its commission. All statutory offenses imposing substantial punishment will be presumed to require at least awareness of committing the [ect.]
  51. Presumption Against Implied Right of Action. A statutes mere prohibition of a certain act does not imply creation of a private right of action for its violation. The creation of such a right must be either express or clearly implied from the text of the statute
  Stabilizing Canons
  52. Presumption Against Change in Common Law. A statute will be construed to alter the common law only when that disposition is clear
  53. Canon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning. A statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning
  54. Prior-Construction Canon. If a statute uses words or phrases that have already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court of last resort, or even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, they are to be understood according to that [ect.]
  55. Presumption Against Implied Repeal. Repeals by implication are disfavored
  -"very much disfavored." But a provision that flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted provision repeals it
  56. Repeal-of-Repealer Canon. The repeal or expiration of a repealing statute does not reinstate the original statute
  57. Desuetude Canon. A statute is not repealed by nonuse or desuetude
  Thirteen Falsities Exposed
  58. false notion that the spirit of a statute should prevail over its letter
  59. false notion that the quest in statutory interpretation is to do justice
  Contents note continued: 60. false notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a statute, the court should reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it confronted the issue
  61. half-truth that consequences of a decision provide the key to sound interpretation
  62. false notion that words should be strictly construed
  63. false notion that tax exemptions
  -or any other exemptions for that matter
  -should be strictly construed
  64. false notion that remedial statutes should be liberally construed
  65. false notion that a statute cannot oust courts of jurisdiction unless it does so expressly
  66. false notion that committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction
  67. false notion that the purpose of interpretation is to discover intent
  68. false notion that the plain language of a statute is the "best evidence" of legislative intent
  69. false notion that lawyers and judges, not being historians, are unqualified to do the historical research that originalism requires
  70. false notion that the Living Constitution is an exception to the rule that legal texts must be given the meaning they bore when adopted.